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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Technology Encroaches on the
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States

I. INTRODUCTION
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States', the United States Supreme
Court decided that a warrantless aerial observation, conducted as part of
an administrative, regulatory investigation of a large manufacturing com-2
plex, was not an "unreasonable search" under the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment reflects the Founders' concern that certain areas
should be shielded from arbitrary government intrusion.3 In deference to
the Founders' concern, the Court has used the fourth amendment to protect
the home4 , and the area immediately surrounding it5, from unreasonable
searches. Furthermore, the Court has recognized that the Founders intended the fourth amendment to protect commercial property owners6 as
well as private home dwellers. Thus, offices and commercial structures
are included in the sphere of protected areas.'
The Court has extended fourth amendment protection beyond the physical structure of the home with the "curtilage" doctrine In contrast, the
Court has limited fourth amendment protection with the "open fields"
doctrine.' The Court has refused to shield with the fourth amendment
activities conducted in expansive areas; simply, the Court will not recognize as reasonable a person's claim to privacy in an open area."0
While the fourth amendment was of vital importance to its framers" ,
it does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, the fourth amendment functions
I. 106 S.Ct. 1819 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonble searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
4. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
5. Id. at 180.
6. Id. at 178 n.8.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 180.
9. Id. at 178 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
10. Id.
11. As the court has explained, the fourth amendment is a "concrete expression of a right which
is basic to a free society." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (citing Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
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simultaneously with other constitutional values and with governmental
duties. Not infrequently, such values collide with each other. In Dow,
two facts of modern life intersected with the fourth amendment values
of privacy, raising difficult questions for fourth amendment protection.
First, with technologic advancement, the government has developed methods
by which it can observe private citizens without being seen or heard. For
example, electronic surveillance technology provides law enforcement
agents with the means to overhear conversations that take place in a
private home or office, without physically intruding on that private enclave. Second, government regulation of industry necessitates observing
commercial and industrial activity. When such governmental capabilities
and duties cross paths with individual interests in privacy, the Constitution
requires that the impartial judgment of a judicial officer be interposed
between the citizen and the government agent.' 2 The Dow Court was
interposed between a commercial entity and the government agency charged
with regulating that entity. The Court's task was to reconcile the corporation's interest in privacy with the government's obligation to observe
the corporation--and the government's sophisticated and unobtrusive means
of meeting its obligation.
The Dow decision is best understood when placed in the context of
fourth amendment doctrine. Thus, this Note discusses the historical framework for fourth amendment analysis. With this foundation, the note then
analyzes the Dow Court decision and the issues that it raises for modern
fourth amendment analysis.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dow Chemical Company (Dow) operates a chemical manufacturing
facility in Midland, Michigan. 3 The facility, a 2,000-acre outdoor manufacturing complex, consists of covered buildings and equipment that
extends between the buildings.' 4 Some areas of the complex are exposed
to aerial observation. 5 Dow has neither completely enclosed the facility 6
nor shielded the exposed areas from aerial observation.' 7 Dow does,
however, maintain elaborate security measures.' 8 For example, Dow has
secured the ground level of the complex from public access and from
public view. '9 In addition, Dow investigates flights over the complex and
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963)).
13. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1822.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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takes measures to retrieve any aerial photogaphs that may have been taken
during such flights. 2"
Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is responsible for regulating emissions from industrial complexes such
as the Dow facility.2 ' In 1978, EPA officials made an on-sight inspection
of the Dow plant. 22 The EPA requested a second inspection, which Dow
refused.23 Rather than obtaining an adminstrative search warrant, and
without informing Dow, the EPA hired a private aerial photographer to
photograph the Dow complex.24
When Dow learned of the EPA's actions, it instituted an action for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Eastern District of Michigan.25 Dow claimed that the EPA's actions constituted a search in violation of the fourth amendment and exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.26
Recognizing that Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy in its
complex, the district court held that the EPA had infringed on Dow's
fourth amendment rights.27 In addition, the district court held that the
EPA had exceeded its statutory authority.2 Accordingly, the district court
granted Dow's motion for summary judgment and enjoined the EPA from
further aerial observation of the Dow complex. 9 The Sixth Circuit reversed',
holding that Dow's privacy expectation was unreasonable and, thus, the
EPA had not conducted a search in violation of the fourth amendment. 3 '
The Sixth Circuit also held that the EPA acted within its statutory authority.32
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court33 , Dow again argued
that the EPA had conducted a search in violation of the fourth amendment
and had exceeded its statutory authority.34 The Court rejected both of
Dow's arguments and concluded that the EPA neither violated the fourth
amendment nor exceeded its statutory authority.35 In affirming the court
20. id. at 1828 (Powell, dissenting).
21. See 42 U.S.C. §7414 (1982).
22. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1822.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F.Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
26. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1822.
27. Id. The district court accepted the parties' concession that the fly-over was a search for fourth
amendment purposes. Id. Thus, the district court limited its analysis to whether the search was
unreasonable. Id.
28. Id.
29. Dow, 536 F.Supp. at 1375.
30. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
31. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1822-23.
32. Id. at 1823.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding that the EPA did not exceed its
statutory authority. Id. The issue of the EPA's authority to conduct an aerial surveillance poses the
interesting question of what tools an administrative agency may use in the performance of its duties.
However, this note is limited to the fourth amendment questions raised by the EPA's actions.
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of appeals' decision36 , the Supreme Court confined its fourth amendment
analysis to the narrow issue of whether an aerial observation of a 2,000
acre outdoor manufacturing plant, without physical entry into the complex, violated the fourth amendment.37
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. The HistoricalFrameworkfor Fourth Amendment Analysis
Three fourth amendment doctrines are relevant to the questions presented in Dow. First, the philosophical underpinnings of the fourth amendment and the court's early interpretation of the amendment lay the foundation
for current fourth amendment analysis. Second, modern fourth amendment interpretation, as first articulated by the court in Katz v. United
States,38 provides the standard against which the Court has evaluated
fourth amendment claims for two decades. Finally, the open fields and
curtilage doctrines are theories which the Court uses to mark the boundaries of fourth amendment protection.
1. The historical underpinnings of the fourth amendment and the
Court's early interpretation of the amendment
The purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect individual privacy,
security and property from arbitrary government intrusion.39 The colonists' aversion to writs of assistance and general warrants, by which a
government agent had sweeping power to search private areas', was the
impetus for the fourth amendment. 4 ' Through the fourth amendment, the
framers expressed their demand for freedom from such arbitrary, unrestrained government intrusion.42 The framers sought to safeguard the "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,"43
a right that is fundamental to a free society." Thus, the fourth amendment
36. Id. The Court was split, 5-4, on the fourth amendment issue. Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell concurred in the majority's holding that the EPA acted within its statutory
authority. However, they dissented from the holding that the EPA did not violate the fourth amendment. Justice Powell wrote for the dissenting justices.
37. Id.
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 311-12 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303-10 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), rev'd on other grounds, 387 U.S. 294.
40. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-31. The Boyd court discussed, at length, the history of warrantless
searches and seizures both in England and in colonial America. See also, Marshall, 436 U.S. at
311-12; Warden, 387 U.S. at 303-10.
41. Boyd, 116 U.S. at624-31.
42. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
43. Boyd, 116 U.S. at630.
44. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).

Spring 1987]

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

shields the citizenry from unreasonable government encroachment on its
right to privacy.45
When interpreting the fourth amendment the Court consistently has
emphasized deep respect for the sanctity of the home.46 However, home
dwellers are not the only class which can invoke the protection of the
fourth amendment. Writs of assistance were particularly offensive to colonial businessmen, who were subject to arbitrary inspection of their
premises. 7 The commercial property owner's demand for protection springs
from the same concerns as the private property owner's claim. The businessman's right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion is as
deeply rooted in the history and origin of the fourth amendment as the
residential occupant's right.4" Thus, the businessman, like the homeowner, has a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government
encroachments on his privacy interests. 49 However, the businessman's
privacy interest in his commercial property is significantly different from
the residential occupant's interest in the sanctity of his home.5" Regardless
of this difference, the fundamental principle applies both to residential
and commercial property owners: the fourth amendment prohibits arbitrary, unreasonable invasions of privacy and personal security.
The Court's early interpretation of the fourth amendment, known as
the trespass doctrine, was a narrow one. Under the trespass doctrine, the
Court confined the amendment's prohibitions to searches and seizures of
tangible property and to actual, physical invasions onto real property".
45. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-31. The Court explained that the fourth amendment protects the right
of man to retreat into his own home "and there to be free from unreasonable government intrusion."
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1961) (footnote omitted).
46. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313 (1972).
47. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311-12; see also Oliver, 446 U.S. at 178 n.8 (citing Marshall v.
Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978)); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,
355 (1977).
48. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311-12.
49. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967). See also G.M. Leasing Corp., 429 U.S.
at 353; Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1969). The Court has
held that the fourth amendment protects commercial property owners from unreasonable criminal
investigative searches. See, 387 U.S. at 543 (citing Go-bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Silverthome Lumer Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). The fourth amendment also prohibits unreasonable administrative
inspections of commercial property. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981) (citing
Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)).
50. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 598-99. Although the Donovan court described the commercial property
owner's privacy interest as significantly different from the home-dweller's interest, the court did not
define with precision the commercial property owner's interest. The court noted that the interest is
not in freedom from all government inspection, but is in freedom from unreasonable government
intrusion. Id. Government intrusions on private commercial property are unreasonable if they are
not authorized by law or if they are unnecessary to further federal interests. Id. (citing Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970)).
51. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); See also Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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Relying on the language of the amendment, the Court concluded that a
search in fourth amendment terms must be of material things, such as
the person, his house, or his effects." Thus, government eavesdropping
by means of a wiretap was constitutionally permissible, even without a
warrant. " Because conversations are not tangible property, they did not
fall within the sphere of fourth amendment protection." Moreover, government action raised fourth amendment concerns only when a government agent actually, physically trespassed on the individual's property.5
Unless the government agent physically penetrated the boundaries of the
defendant's property, the Court found no need to engage in fourth amendment analysis.56 For nearly a century, the Court adhered to the trespass
doctrine." Technologic innovations which provided the government with
means to observe individuals without trespassing on their property 8 prompted
the Court to chip away at the trespass doctrine. Initially, the Court extended fourth amendment protection to unreasonable searches and seizures
of intangible property. " In addition, the Court ceased to require a trespass
under local property law before it would confer fourth amendment protection.' The Court gradually discredited the concept that property interests controlled the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 6 Finally, the62 Court expressly rejected the trespass doctrine in
Katz v. United States.
2. Katz v. United States and the modern fourth amendment analysis
With Katz v. United States63 , the Supreme Court accomplished two
tasks. The Court abandoned the trespass doctrine and posited a new
criterion for fourth amendment analysis: the "reasonable" or "legitimate"
expectation of privacy. 64 In doing so, the Court departed from the notion
52. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. The amendment provides: "The right of the people to be free
in their persons, houses, papers and effects shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
53. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-512 (1961); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
56. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466
(1928); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942)).
57. The Court applied the trespass doctrine from the time of its 1885 decision in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885) until 1967, when it decided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
58. For example, electronic surveillance devices.
59. Warden, 387 U.S. at 305 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963))
(conversations).
60. Warden, 387 U.S. at 305 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
61. Warden, 387 U.S. at 304.
62. 389 U.S. at 353.
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. As the Court recently noted, it has used the words "reasonable" and "legitimate" interchangeably to describe an expectation of privacy that is entitled to fourth amendment protection.
California v. Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1816 n.4. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, concurring); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 143-53 n.12 (1978)).
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that fourth amendment protection is predicated on a physical intrusion
onto property.65 Indeed, the Katz Court held, the lack of physical intrusion
"can have no constitutional significance."' The Court consistently has
complied with the Katz mandate.67 In place of the trespass doctrine, the
Katz Court posited a two-part inquiry which has become the starting point
for all fourth amendment analysis. To determine whether a government
officer has conducted a search in fourth amendment terms' , the Court
asks two questions. First, has the person claiming fourth amendment
protection manifested an actual, subjective expectation of privacy?69 Second, is his expectation legitimate; that is, does society recognize his
expectation as reasonable?7 ° With the Katz test, the Court focuses on the
individual's privacy interest, rather than on his property rights. 7' Subsequent courts uniformly have applied the Katz test to fourth amendment
claims.72
The Katz theory is not complex; its application, however, has proved
to be a challenging task. Under the Katz test, if a government officer did
not invade a legitimate expectation of privacy, he did not conduct a search
in fourth amendment terms.73 If the officer did not make a search, the
fourth amendment does not govern his actions. Thus, the threshold question is whether the defendant's privacy expectation is legitimate."4 The
Katz Court neither defined a legitimate expectation nor formulated an
objective standard of legitimacy. Since Katz, however, the Court has
utilized a variety of broad guidelines to evaluate the legitimacy or reasonableness of an asserted privacy interest. Four of these guidelines are
instructive.7 5 First, a legitimate expectation is more than a subjective
expectation of avoiding discovery. 76 Second, a legitimate expectation must
be rooted in a concept outside fourth amendment doctrine. " For example,
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 753, 740 (1979)).
68. See infra note 73.
69. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, concurring). The majority in Katz discussed the same concepts.
However, subsequent courts have used Justice Harlan's language rather than the majority's.
70. Id.
71. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967)); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 7 (1977); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 752 (1971)).
72. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177; Knons,
460 U.S. at 280-81 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
73. Maryland v. Macon, 105 S.Ct. 2278, 2282 (1985); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
74. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
75. This list is by no means exhaustive. Rather, it illustrates the nature of the Court's inquiry
into the legitimacy of an asserted privacy interest.
76. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
In addition, taking steps to protect one's privacy does not conclusively establish legitimacy. Oliver,
466 U.S. at 182. The Court focuses on whether the government has infringed on personal and social
values that the fourth amendment protects. Id. Whether the defendant chose to conceal his activity
is neither dispositve of nor relevant to the legitimacy inquiry. Id.
77. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
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a fourth amendment claimant may rely on social norms or on real or
personal property laws which recognize his claim to privacy." Third, no
single factor determines whether an expectation is legitimate." Rather,
the Court looks to a variety of factors8", including the intent of the
framers" , the use to which the individual put the area", and societal
understandings that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection
from government intrusion. 3 Finally, while property concepts no longer
are dispositive of fourth amendment questions, they are not immaterial
to the question of legitimate expectations." Although the Court has never
articulated a single, dispositive test, it has developed two doctrines which
mark the bounds of fourth amendment protection. The curtilage doctrine
and the open fields doctrine provide further guidance in assessing whether
an asserted privacy interest is legitimate.
3. Curtilage and open fields: The boundaries of fourth amendment
protection
When an individual invokes fourth amendment protection for activities
which occur inside his home or office, his claim to privacy is not difficult
to assess.s However, a claim for protection of activities which occur
outdoors poses difficult problems for fourth amendment analysis. The
fourth amendment protects some, but not all, outdoor activity. The Court
uses the curtilage and open fields doctrines to determine whether a claim
to privacy in outdoor activities is legitimate. Fourth amendment protection
extends beyond the walls of a home and encompasses the curtilage area.86
The curtilage is the area immediately surrounding the home, to which its
residents extend the activites of homelife.8 7 For fourth amendment pur78. Id.
79. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell,
concurring)).
80. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78.
81. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 7-8 (1977)).
82. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960)).
83. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78 (citing United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
84. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83; Rakas at 143-44 n.12.
85. See supra note 45.
86. Whether a curtilage exists in the area immediately surrounding a commercial structure or an
industrial complex is a question that arises after the Dow decision.
87. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12. From the common law to the most recent curtilage decision,
the Court has described the curtilage as the area to which extends the intimate activites associated
with the sanctity of the home and the privacies of life. See, e.g., California v.Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct.
1809, 1816, 1819 (1986) (citing Oliver v. United States, 446 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885)). Although the Court has neither conclusively nor
precisely defined the concept, several criteria have been relevant to determining whether an area is
a curtilage. The Court has looked to factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may
expect that the area will remain private, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (citing United States v. Van Dyke,
643 F.2d 992, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 457, 453 (5th Cir. 1978);
Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 923 (1956). In
addition, the close nexus of the area to the home, Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. at 1812, and clearly marked
boundaries, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n. 12, have been important to the Court's determination. Finally,
the Court has noted that one should be able to understand the curtilage concept from daily experience.
Id.
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poses, the Court considers the curtilage to be part of the home."8 In its
most recent discussion of the curtilage doctrine"9 , the Court described the
protection that the fourth amendment affords to the curtilage: it is the
protection of families and of personal privacy in an area that is intimately
linked to the home and that enjoys the "most heightened" privacy expectations.' However, the fourth amendment does not shield the curtilage
from all government observation. 9 ' Rather, an individual has a legitimate,
if somewhat limited, expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his home.
In contrast, "open fields" are outside the scope of fourth amendment
protection. Although the Court has never defined "open field" 92, it has
given general descriptions of what constitutes an open field. For example,
the Court has noted that an open field includes any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.93 In addition, the Court has commented that the area need not be "open" or a "field" as those terms are
commonly used.' Historically, the Court distinguished between the curtilage and the open fields95 , granting fourth amendment protection in the
curtilage and denying it in open fields.96 Relying on this distinction, the
Court has concluded that an individual does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the open fields. 97 In support of its conclusion, the
Court has noted that the open fields do not provide the setting for the
intimate activities that the fourth amendment protects. 98 The Court has
also reasoned that there is no social interest in protecting the activities,
such as raising crops, that occur in the open fields.' Furthermore, open
fields usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that
homes or commercial structures are not. , Finally, the Court has observed
that the police and the public can survey the open fields from the air. o'
Although it is not clear what an open field is, it is clear that an individual
cannot invoke fourth amendment protection in such an area.
The Dow Court confronted each of the issues outlined above. Dow
Chemical Company, a large corporation, laid claim to privacy interests
88. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
89. Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. at 1812.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1826.
93. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n. 1l.
94. Id. Additionally, the Oliver court noted that most open fields are not close to any structure,
id. at 182 n.12, and that they are, by their nature, open and unoccupied. Id. at 179 n.10.
95. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE at 223, 225, 226);
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (citations omitted); Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,
416 U.S. 861, 864-65 (1974).
96. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
97. Id. at 180. When articulating the legitimate expectation of privacy test, the court noted that
what one knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of fourth amendment protection. Katz,
389 U.S. at 351 (citations omitted).
98. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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in a manufacturing complex. The fourth amendment protection of commercial establishments is deeply rooted in the history of the amendment.
For the Dow Court, however, a claim to privacy in a chemical manufacturing plant did not implicate the same fourth amendment values as a
claim to privacy in a home. In addition, the alleged fourth amendment
violation occurred without a physical trespass onto Dow's property. Although physical intrusion has been constitutionally insignificant since
Katz, the Dow court relied heavily on this factor. Finally, the outdoor
area in which Dow claimed a privacy interest fit none of the traditional,
albeit nebulous, criteria for a curtilage or an open field. None of the
issues presented to the Dow Court fit precisely into established fourth
amendment doctrine.
B. The Dow Court Decision
The Dow court held that aerial photograhy of an outdoor industrial
complex is not a search prohibited by the fourth amendment.' °2 Dow
contended that state and federal trade secrets laws'0 3 and the curtilage
doctrine shielded it from aerial photography of the complex. "0The Court
rejected Dow's trade secrets argument at the outset, dismissing it as
irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis.'0 5 The Court then considered
and rejected Dow's assertion that the curtilage doctrine protected Dow
from aerial photography of its facility. The starting point for the Court's
analysis of the curtilage doctrine was its decision in California v. Ciraolo."'6 In Ciraolo, the Court held that a naked-eye aerial observation of
the curtilage of a home is not a search prohibited by the fourth amendment.' 07 Given the Ciraolo decision, the Dow case presented two additional issues: whether the curtilage doctrine encompasses the outdoor
areas of an industrial complex' and whether taking photographs with
aerial mapping equipment is permissible. "0Holding that the open fields
doctrine, not the curtilage doctrine, encompasses the complex, the Court
found the EPA's photography to be constitutionally permissible. "0 Before
delving into the curtilage question, the Court held that state and federal
trade secrets laws were irrelevant to its fourth amendment inquiry. "' Dow
102. Dow, 106 S.Ct at 1827.
103. Id. at 1823.
104. Id. at 1825.
105. Id. at 1823.
106. 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986). The Court decided Dow and Ciraolo on the same day.
107. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1824-25 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986)).
108. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1824.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1826-27.
11. Id. at 1823. Justice Powell, in dissent, characterized the trade secrets laws as "society's
express determination that commercial entities have a legitimate interest in the privacy of certain
kinds of property." Id. at 1832 (Powell, dissenting). Because Dow took every feasible step to protect
its privacy, its expectation was, according to the dissenting Justices, reasonable. Id.
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contended that trade secrets laws protected it from aerial observation." 2
The Court dismissed Dow's assertions as irrelevant" 3 for two reasons.
First, tort law governing unfair competition did not define the scope of
fourth amendment protection." 4 Second, the trade secrets laws on which
Dow relied did not proscribe the EPA's surveillance activity. The statutory
prohibitions which Dow invoked bar only photography undertaken with
an intent to compete. "5 The EPA intended to regulate Dow, not to compete
with it. "' 6 Whatever privacy interest society may have expressed in the
trade secrets laws were thus irrelevant to the Court.
The heart of the Court's decision is its conclusion that the Dow complex
is more like an open field than a curtilage for purposes of aerial surviellance. Dow contended that the outdoor area of its facility was an "industrial
curtilage. ""'7 Thus, Dow argued, it could expect the same fourth amendment protection in its industrial curtilage as a private homeowner may
expect in his backyard." 8 The Court recognized that Dow does enjoy
some fourth amendment protection.' ' However, the Court rejected the
notion that the outdoor area was a curtilage and, as such, entitled to
heightened fourth amendment protection. "oRather, the area was analogous to an open field'', a place in which Dow has no legitimate claim
to privacy. The Court noted at the outset that a commercial entity does
enjoy some fourth amendment protection. 2 Two notions limited the scope
of protection that Dow could reasonably expect. First, the Court stated
that the government has greater latitude to conduct warrantless searches
of commercial property than of private property.'23 The Court explained
that a commercial property owner has a significantly different privacy
expectation than a private property owner.2 4 In contrast to a homeowner's
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 1824.
118. Id.
119. Id.at 1825.
120. Id.
121. Id.at 1825-26.
122. Id.at 1825.
123. Id.at 1826.
124. Id. The dissenting Justices took issue with the majority's reasoning. Justice Powell noted
that, in the realm of administrative inspections, the Court has recognized an exception to the fourth
amendment rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. Id.at 1830 (Powell,
dissenting). If Congress has determined that warrantless searches are necessary to enforce a regulatory
purpose and if the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently defined and comprehensive, warrantless
searches are constitutionally permissible. Id. (citations omitted). This exception for pervasively
regulated industries is predicated on the idea that the regulatory scheme adequately protects the
business' right to privacy. Id. at 1831 (citations omitted). The exception is not founded on the
difference between residential and commercial property. Id. According to Justice Powell, the majority's reasoning misunderstands the Court's previous decisions in this area. Id.
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interest, a commercial entity's reasonable privacy interest is not in freedom from all inspections.'25 Second, the Court distinguished between
Dow's privacy interest in the interior of its buildings and its privacy
interest in the area outside those buildings.' 26 The Court acknowledged
that Dow does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior
of its buildings. 27
' If the EPA had physically intruded on the interior of
an enclosed building, its actions would have implicated significantly different fourth amendment questions. 28
' However, an aerial observation of
outdoor areas surrounding enclosed buildings did not raise fourth amendment concerns for the Court. 29
'
Although the Court acknowledged that the fourth amendment does
protect Dow, it rejected Dow's argument that the complex was a curtilage
area for purposes of aerial surveillance. To determine whether Dow's
facility fit within the curtilage doctrine, the Court returned to its description of the curtilage of a home in Oliver v. United States.'3 ° The Oliver
Court characterized the curtilage of a home as the area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of the home and the
privacies of life. ,' For the Oliver Court, the concept of a curtilage was
one easily understood from daily life.' 32 The Dow Court concluded that
the manufacturing complex did not fit within the Oliver Court's descriptions and observations. It was significant to the Court that the area was
not immediately adjacent to a private home. 33
' Moreover, the Court held,
the intimate activites associated with the sanctity of the home and the
privacies of life do not extend to the outdoor areas of a chemical manufacturing plant. 34
' The area was not a curtilage; thus, it was not an area
in which Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy. '
While concluding that the facility was not a curtilage, the court conceded that it was not exactly an open field' 36 . Rather, the complex lay
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1825.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1826.
129. Id. The dissenting Justices argued that the majority has "simply repudiate[d] Katz" by relying
on the absence of a physical intrusion. Id. at 1831 (Powell, dissenting).
130. Id. at 1825 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170. (1984)).
131. Id. (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)); California v. Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986)).
132. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1826 n.3.
133. Id. at 1826 n.4.
134. id. at 1825.
135. Id. In dissent, Justice Powell argued that the facility is neither a curtilage nor an open field.
Id. at 1833 (Powell, dissenting). Moreover, the distinction was irrelevant to the dissenting Justices.
Id. Dow did not argue that its privacy interest was equivalent to a home dweller's interest. Id.
Finally, the dissenting Justices noted, the Court had never before used the curtilage doctrine to limit
fourth amendment protection. Id.
136. Id. at 1825-26.
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somewhere between a curtilage and an open field, but lacked important
characteristics of each concept.' 37 The Court again returned to the Oliver
decision to evaluate whether the complex was more analogous to an open
field or to a curtilage.' 38 The Oliver Court explained that an area need
not meet the common understanding of the terms "open" or "field" for
purposes of the open fields doctrine. 3 9 Although the Oliver Court did not
conclusively define an open field'", it did note that an open field may
include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage."'
In contrast, the Oliver Court characterized a curtilage as a well-defined,
limited area."'4 Noting the Oliver Court's distinction and the expansive
nature of Dow's industrial complex' 43 , the Dow Court found that the
complex was more analogous to an open field that to a curtilage. "
As an open field, the complex was not an area in which Dow had a
' Rather, the Court explained, without
legitimate expectation of privacy. 45
obtaining a warrant, the EPA could observe in Dow's open field whatever
the public could observe. '" Dow conceded, as the Ciraolo Court held,
that an aerial, naked-eye observation would not raise any fourth amendment concerns. 47 The Dow Court expanded the Ciraoloprinciple, holding
that the EPA may observe the complex through the eyes of an aerial
mapping camera-without first seeking a warrant.' 48
The second question that the Dow Court confronted was whether photographing the complex with an aerial mapping camera was permissible. 4 9
To make its determination, the Court described three things that the
photographs and equipment were not. First, the photographs were not
revealing of enough intimate detail to raise constitutional concerns. 0
Although the photographs contained more than a naked-eye view of the
complex 5', the EPA's enhanced view did not implicate fourth amendment
prohibitions. ' Second, the equipment was not highly sophisticated technology that is unavailable to the public.' 53 Rather, the EPA used a "con137.
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ventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in
mapmaking. ' " Third, the camera was not capable of penetrating the
walls of Dow's facility.'55 By evaluating what the photographs and equipment were not, the Court concluded that the EPA's choice of surveillance
equipment was not constitutionally impermissible.
Although the Court did not object to the EPA's choice of equipment
in the instant case, it noted that different equipment may raise constitutional concerns. 5' 6 The Court distinguished between the EPA's equipment
and "highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available
to the public, such as satellite technology."' 5 7 Equipment that is more
difficult to obtain or more sophisticated than an aerial mapping camera
may be constitutionally impermissible absent a warrant.' 58 In addition,
the Court distinguished between the EPA's camera, which merely enhanced the photographer's vision, and a device which could penetrate
walls or windows.' 59 Such an intrusive device would have raised significantly different questions for the Dow Court. ,"0 The Court did not, however, define how sophisticated, how intrusive, or how unavailable the
government's equipment would have to be to raise constitutional concerns.
C. Implications of the Dow Decision
In the two decades that have lapsed since the Court formulated the
Katz test, the focus of fourth amendment analysis has been the reasonable
expectation of privacy. The Katz decision provided a standard which
protected fourth amendment rights as technology increased the opportunity for unsuspected and unnoticed intrusions into private areas and
activities.'6 ' The Court's decision in Dow raises significant questions
about the utility of the Katz standard in fourth amendment jurisprudence.
Specifically, the commercial property owner must ask how-and, more
importantly, if-he can demonstrate an expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to accept as reasonable. More generally, one must wonder
whether the Court is abandoning the Katz analysis, at least in commercial
cases, and returning to the trespass doctrine. The answers to these questions will determine not only how commercial entities should assert their
fourth amendment rights, but also whether those rights will be narrowly
interpreted in the post-Dow era.
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The Dow Court created a significant challenge for the commercial entity
seeking fourth amendment protection. To successfully shield himself from
government intrusion, the commercial property owner must demonstrate
a privacy interest that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. The
Dow Court rejected two methods by which a commercial entity could
establish a reasonable privacy interest. Neither legislative action which
protects trade secrets nor the curtilage doctrine were sufficient indications
that Dow's expectation was reasonable. If statutory protection of corporate
activity does not indicate society's acceptance of the corporation's privacy
interest, the commercial entity must search for another source of legitimacy. The Court's refusal to apply the curtilage doctrine may indicate
that a commercial entity does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
beyond its enclosed buildings. After Dow, a commercial entity may find
it difficult to establish that his expectation of privacy is one that society
is prepared to accept as reasonable. 62
' The Court has instructed the fourth
amendment claimant to refer to sources outside the fourth amendment
for indications of society's acceptance of his asserted privacy interest. 163
No single source is dispositive.' 6" However, "understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society"' 65 have been one indicia of legitimacy. , Dow referred to federal and state trade secrets laws to legitimate
its expectation of privacy in the complex. 6' 7 The Court, however, refused
to consider the laws as a source of society's acceptance.' 68 Rather, the
Court held, such legislative actions were irrelevant to fourth amendment
analysis. 69
' In other words, legislative recognition of Dow's right to preserve as private the activites conducted in its complex is immaterial to
the reasonableness of Dow's expectation. Certainly, a statute is a source
outside the fourth amendment. Moreover, statutory protection is at least
an indicia that society recognizes some privacy interests in the complex.
If legislative protection of a privacy interest is not pertinent to fourth
162. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
163. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
164. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell,
concurring)).
165. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
166. Id. Indeed, the Court reiterated this notion on the day it delivered the Dow decision. The
Ciraolo court noted that the test for a reasonable expectation is whether the government intrusion
infringes on personal and societal values. Ciraolo, 106 S.Ct. at 1812.
167. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1823. The majority characterized Dow's reference to trade secrets laws
as a claim that those laws protect Dow from any aerial photography. Id. Justice Powell, in dissent,
explained that Dow did not assert that its fourth amendment protection was coextensive with the
scope of the trade secret laws. Id. at 1832 n. I I (Powell, dissenting). On the contrary, Dow argued
that the laws are society's express determination of Dow's legitimate privacy interest. Id. at 1832.
In other words, the laws are a legislative pronouncement that society recognizes as reasonable Dow's
claim to privacy in activities conducted in the complex. Id. at 1832 n. 1I, n. 12.
168. Id. at 1823.
169. Id.
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amendment analysis, to what source should future fourth amendment
claimants refer?
More importantly, the Dow decision leaves open the question of whether
a commercial entity can ever invoke fourth amendment protection under
the curtilage doctrine. The Court held that a manufacturing complex the
size of the Dow plant is not analogous to the curtilage of a dwelling.' 7
In addition, the Court declined to address the issue raised when the
Seventh Circuit' 7' applied the curtilage doctrine to a commercial entity.'
Rather, the Court distinguished the cases on the grounds that one involved
a physical intrusion while the other did not.' The Court's distinction
leaves open the possibility that a physical intrusion into the open area
immediately surrounding a commercial complex may implicate the fourth
amendment. However, the Court also relied on its finding that the intimate
activites associated with the sanctity of the home do not occur in Dow's
facility. ' The Court's observation may indicate the the curtilage doctrine
is available only to private home dwellers.
Even if the Court had found that Dow had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the complex, it may have reached an identical conclusion. The
Court discussed the curtilage and open fields doctrines, two theories by
which the Court evaluates whether an expectation is reasonable. However,
the Court focused on the lack of a physical intrusion and on the EPA's
method of surveillance. The Court's emphasis on such factors may signal
a shift away from the Katz reasonable expectation analysis. So long as
the means of surveillance are neither too intrusive nor too technologically
advanced, aerial surveillance may be constitutionally permissible.
Although the Dow Court discussed Dow's reasonable expectation of
privacy, it departed from the Katz analysis. The presence or absence of
a physical intrusion has been constitutionally insignificant'75 since the
Katz decision. Under the Katz standard, fourth amendment rights have
retained their strength despite technologic advances which permit the
government to intrude, unheard and unseen, into private areas and activites. 76 However, the Dow Court predicated Dow's fourth amendment
protection on two factors: the lack of a physical intrusion into an enclosed
170. Id. at 1825.
171. United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1982).
172. Id. at 702. The question presented in Swart was whether police entry onto business premises
after business hours was a search in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 700. In describing
the protection that the fourth amendment affords to the curtilage, the Court referred both to the
curtilage of a home and to the curtilage of a business. Id. at 702. The Seventh Circuit left it to the
District Court on remand to determine whether the facts warranted the conclusion that the area in
question was a curtilage. Id.
173. Dow, at 1827 n.7.
174. Id. at 1827.
175. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
176. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1827 (Powell, dissenting).
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structure and the level of sophistication of the EPA's surveillance equipment. 77 The Katz Court expressly and emphatically rejected the type of
analysis on which the Dow court relied. Despite the Katz mandate, the
Dow Court gave constitutional significance to the absence of a physical
trespass. In addition, the Court introduced a new criterion into fourth
amendment analysis.
The Court held that the EPA's actions were permissible, in part, because
the EPA's equipment was neither generally unavailable7 . nor highly sophisticated. 79
' As Justice Powell noted in dissent, the Court has never
utilized this line of reasoning in developing fourth amendment jurisprudence. 8 0 Moreover, the availability and sophistication of equipment are
irrelevant to the issue of a reasonable expectation. The Dow court did
not explain if or how its analysis fit within the Katz inquiry.
The Court's method of analysis was not new and should not have been
unexpected. Previously, the Court held that the fourth amendment does
not prohibit officers from "augmenting the sensory facilities bestowed
upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology
[has] afforded them."' 8 While officers may supplement their vision with
aerial mapping cameras as they fly over a chemical plant, they may not
supplement it with the most advanced and intrusive surveillance equipment available. The Dow Court expressly noted that more sophisticated
equipment may be constitutionally impermissible absent a warrant. 2 The
Court did not indicate the level of technology that would exceed the
bounds of constitutionally permissible technology. The Dow decision may
permit government officers to utilize advances in surveillance technology,
within the amorphous limits at which the Court intimated. However, the
Dow decision may create the very danger that the Supreme Court predicted
a century ago.' Aerial mapping cameras may be "the obnoxious thing
in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of behavior."' Should subsequent
courts evaluate fourth amendment claims by rating the sophistication and
novelty of the government's choice of equipment-rather than by the
reasonableness of the asserted privacy interest-fourth amendment protection will gradually 8 diminish
as technology becomes generally dissem5
inated and available.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is not clear whether the Dow Court wholly abandoned the Katz
standard or whether it merely added two factors to its fourth amendment
inquiry. Whatever the Court's intent, its effect will be to narrow the scope
of fourth amendment protection available in a curtilage area and to make
aerial surveillance presumptively reasonable. Both the Dow and Ciraolo
courts reiterated the notion that the curtilage is an area in which privacy
expectations are reasonable. 16 However, the fourth amendment now protects those expectations only when the government physically intrudes
on the curtilage and when the government's surveillance equipment is
too technologically advanced. The CiraoloCourt held that an aerial nakedeye observation of the curtilage of a home is constitutionally permissi' Even in the curtilage area, where privacy interests are reasonable
ble. 87
and at their highest,'" those interests are not absolutely reasonable. Rather,
privacy expectations are not reasonable if the government observes the
area without making a physical trespass and if it surveys the area from
above, where any commercial airline passenger could be.' 89 The Dow
Court extended the Ciraolo holding to include aerial observation supplemented by advances in surveillance technology."9 Thus, so long as the
government conducts an aerial surveillance from an altitude at which
commercial airplanes may fly and with surveillance equipment that is not
too advanced, it has not conducted a search under the fourth amendment.
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